> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://blog.1nf1n1ty.team/hacktricks/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://blog.1nf1n1ty.team/hacktricks/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-apps-inspecting-debugging-and-fuzzing.md). # macOS Apps - Inspecting, debugging and Fuzzing {% hint style="success" %} Learn & practice AWS Hacking:[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)\ Learn & practice GCP Hacking: [**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
Support HackTricks * Check the [**subscription plans**](https://github.com/sponsors/carlospolop)! * **Join the** 💬 [**Discord group**](https://discord.gg/hRep4RUj7f) or the [**telegram group**](https://t.me/peass) or **follow** us on **Twitter** 🐦 [**@hacktricks\_live**](https://twitter.com/hacktricks_live)**.** * **Share hacking tricks by submitting PRs to the** [**HackTricks**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks) and [**HackTricks Cloud**](https://github.com/carlospolop/hacktricks-cloud) github repos.
{% endhint %} ### [WhiteIntel](https://whiteintel.io)
[**WhiteIntel**](https://whiteintel.io) is a **dark-web** fueled search engine that offers **free** functionalities to check if a company or its customers have been **compromised** by **stealer malwares**. Their primary goal of WhiteIntel is to combat account takeovers and ransomware attacks resulting from information-stealing malware. You can check their website and try their engine for **free** at: {% embed url="" %} *** ## Static Analysis ### otool & objdump & nm ```bash otool -L /bin/ls #List dynamically linked libraries otool -tv /bin/ps #Decompile application ``` {% code overflow="wrap" %} ```bash objdump -m --dylibs-used /bin/ls #List dynamically linked libraries objdump -m -h /bin/ls # Get headers information objdump -m --syms /bin/ls # Check if the symbol table exists to get function names objdump -m --full-contents /bin/ls # Dump every section objdump -d /bin/ls # Dissasemble the binary objdump --disassemble-symbols=_hello --x86-asm-syntax=intel toolsdemo #Disassemble a function using intel flavour ``` {% endcode %} ```bash nm -m ./tccd # List of symbols ``` ### jtool2 & Disarm You can [**download disarm from here**](https://newosxbook.com/tools/disarm.html). ```bash ARCH=arm64e disarm -c -i -I --signature /path/bin # Get bin info and signature ARCH=arm64e disarm -c -l /path/bin # Get binary sections ARCH=arm64e disarm -c -L /path/bin # Get binary commands (dependencies included) ARCH=arm64e disarm -c -S /path/bin # Get symbols (func names, strings...) ARCH=arm64e disarm -c -d /path/bin # Get disasembled jtool2 -d __DATA.__const myipc_server | grep MIG # Get MIG info ``` You can [**download jtool2 here**](http://www.newosxbook.com/tools/jtool.html) or install it with `brew`. ```bash # Install brew install --cask jtool2 jtool2 -l /bin/ls # Get commands (headers) jtool2 -L /bin/ls # Get libraries jtool2 -S /bin/ls # Get symbol info jtool2 -d /bin/ls # Dump binary jtool2 -D /bin/ls # Decompile binary # Get signature information ARCH=x86_64 jtool2 --sig /System/Applications/Automator.app/Contents/MacOS/Automator # Get MIG information jtool2 -d __DATA.__const myipc_server | grep MIG ``` {% hint style="danger" %} **jtool is deprecated in favour of disarm** {% endhint %} ### Codesign / ldid {% hint style="success" %} **`Codesign`** can be found in **macOS** while **`ldid`** can be found in **iOS** {% endhint %} ```bash # Get signer codesign -vv -d /bin/ls 2>&1 | grep -E "Authority|TeamIdentifier" # Check if the app’s contents have been modified codesign --verify --verbose /Applications/Safari.app # Get entitlements from the binary codesign -d --entitlements :- /System/Applications/Automator.app # Check the TCC perms # Check if the signature is valid spctl --assess --verbose /Applications/Safari.app # Sign a binary codesign -s toolsdemo # Get signature info ldid -h # Get entitlements ldid -e # Change entilements ## /tmp/entl.xml is a XML file with the new entitlements to add ldid -S/tmp/entl.xml ``` ### SuspiciousPackage [**SuspiciousPackage**](https://mothersruin.com/software/SuspiciousPackage/get.html) is a tool useful to inspect **.pkg** files (installers) and see what is inside before installing it.\ These installers have `preinstall` and `postinstall` bash scripts that malware authors usually abuse to **persist** **the** **malware**. ### hdiutil This tool allows to **mount** Apple disk images (**.dmg**) files to inspect them before running anything: ```bash hdiutil attach ~/Downloads/Firefox\ 58.0.2.dmg ``` It will be mounted in `/Volumes` ### Packed binaries * Check for high entropy * Check the strings (is there is almost no understandable string, packed) * The UPX packer for MacOS generates a section called "\_\_XHDR" ## Static Objective-C analysis ### Metadata {% hint style="danger" %} Note that programs written in Objective-C **retain** their class declarations **when** **compiled** into [Mach-O binaries](/hacktricks/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-files-folders-and-binaries/universal-binaries-and-mach-o-format.md). Such class declarations **include** the name and type of: {% endhint %} * The interfaces defined * The interface methods * The interface instance variables * The protocols defined Note that this names could be obfuscated to make the reversing of the binary more difficult. ### Function calling When a function is called in a binary that uses objective-C, the compiled code instead of calling that function, it will call **`objc_msgSend`**. Which will be calling the final function: ![](/files/XijdIjePFPyFA9kbdXPf) The params this function expects are: * The first parameter (**self**) is "a pointer that points to the **instance of the class that is to receive the message**". Or more simply put, it’s the object that the method is being invoked upon. If the method is a class method, this will be an instance of the class object (as a whole), whereas for an instance method, self will point to an instantiated instance of the class as an object. * The second parameter, (**op**), is "the selector of the method that handles the message". Again, more simply put, this is just the **name of the method.** * The remaining parameters are any **values that are required by the method** (op). See how to **get this info easily with `lldb` in ARM64** in this page: {% content-ref url="/pages/RTHh2CBdHMuT1PDjb5Fg" %} [Introduction to ARM64v8](/hacktricks/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-apps-inspecting-debugging-and-fuzzing/arm64-basic-assembly.md) {% endcontent-ref %} x64: | **Argument** | **Register** | **(for) objc\_msgSend** | | ----------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------ | | **1st argument** | **rdi** | **self: object that the method is being invoked upon** | | **2nd argument** | **rsi** | **op: name of the method** | | **3rd argument** | **rdx** | **1st argument to the method** | | **4th argument** | **rcx** | **2nd argument to the method** | | **5th argument** | **r8** | **3rd argument to the method** | | **6th argument** | **r9** | **4th argument to the method** | | **7th+ argument** |

rsp+
(on the stack)

| **5th+ argument to the method** | ### Dump ObjectiveC metadata ### Dynadump [**Dynadump**](https://github.com/DerekSelander/dynadump) is a tool to class-dump Objective-C binaries. The github specifies dylibs but this also works with executables. ```bash ./dynadump dump /path/to/bin ``` At the time of the writing, this is **currently the one that works the best**. #### Regular tools ```bash nm --dyldinfo-only /path/to/bin otool -ov /path/to/bin objdump --macho --objc-meta-data /path/to/bin ``` #### class-dump [**class-dump**](https://github.com/nygard/class-dump/) is the original tool to generates declarations for the classes, categories and protocols in ObjetiveC formatted code. It's old and unmaintained so it probably won't work properly. #### ICDump [**iCDump**](https://github.com/romainthomas/iCDump) is a modern and cross-platform Objective-C class dump. Compared to existing tools, iCDump can run independently from the Apple ecosystem and it exposes Python bindings. ```python import icdump metadata = icdump.objc.parse("/path/to/bin") print(metadata.to_decl()) ``` ## Static Swift analysis With Swift binaries, since there is Objective-C compatibility, sometimes you can extract declarations using [class-dump](https://github.com/nygard/class-dump/) but not always. With the **`jtool -l`** or **`otool -l`** command lines it's possible ti find several sections that start with **`__swift5`** prefix: ```bash jtool2 -l /Applications/Stocks.app/Contents/MacOS/Stocks LC 00: LC_SEGMENT_64 Mem: 0x000000000-0x100000000 __PAGEZERO LC 01: LC_SEGMENT_64 Mem: 0x100000000-0x100028000 __TEXT [...] Mem: 0x100026630-0x100026d54 __TEXT.__swift5_typeref Mem: 0x100026d60-0x100027061 __TEXT.__swift5_reflstr Mem: 0x100027064-0x1000274cc __TEXT.__swift5_fieldmd Mem: 0x1000274cc-0x100027608 __TEXT.__swift5_capture [...] ``` You can find further information about the [**information stored in these section in this blog post**](https://knight.sc/reverse%20engineering/2019/07/17/swift-metadata.html). Moreover, **Swift binaries might have symbols** (for example libraries need to store symbols so its functions can be called). The **symbols usually have the info about the function name** and attr in a ugly way, so they are very useful and there are "**demanglers"** that can get the original name: ```bash # Ghidra plugin https://github.com/ghidraninja/ghidra_scripts/blob/master/swift_demangler.py # Swift cli swift demangle ``` ## Dynamic Analysis {% hint style="warning" %} Note that in order to debug binaries, **SIP needs to be disabled** (`csrutil disable` or `csrutil enable --without debug`) or to copy the binaries to a temporary folder and **remove the signature** with `codesign --remove-signature ` or allow the debugging of the binary (you can use [this script](https://gist.github.com/carlospolop/a66b8d72bb8f43913c4b5ae45672578b)) {% endhint %} {% hint style="warning" %} Note that in order to **instrument system binaries**, (such as `cloudconfigurationd`) on macOS, **SIP must be disabled** (just removing the signature won't work). {% endhint %} ### APIs macOS exposes some interesting APIs that give information about the processes: * `proc_info`: This is the main one giving a lot of information about each process. You need to be root to get other processes information but you don't need special entitlements or mach ports. * `libsysmon.dylib`: It allows to get information about processes via XPC exposed functions, however, it's needed to have the entitlement `com.apple.sysmond.client`. ### Stackshot & microstackshots **Stackshotting** is a technique used to capture the state of the processes, including the call stacks of all running threads. This is particularly useful for debugging, performance analysis, and understanding the behavior of the system at a specific point in time. On iOS and macOS, stackshotting can be performed using several tools and methods like the tools **`sample`** and **`spindump`**. ### Sysdiagnose This tool (`/usr/bini/ysdiagnose`) basically collects a lot of information from your computer executing tens of different commands such as `ps`, `zprint`... It must be run as **root** and the daemon `/usr/libexec/sysdiagnosed` has very interesting entitlements such as `com.apple.system-task-ports` and `get-task-allow`. Its plist is located in `/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.sysdiagnose.plist` which declares 3 MachServices: * `com.apple.sysdiagnose.CacheDelete`: Deletes old archives in /var/rmp * `com.apple.sysdiagnose.kernel.ipc`: Special port 23 (kernel) * `com.apple.sysdiagnose.service.xpc`: User mode interface through `Libsysdiagnose` Obj-C class. Three arguments in a dict can be passed (`compress`, `display`, `run`) ### Unified Logs MacOS generates a lot of logs that can be very useful when running an application trying to understand **what is it doing**. Moreover, the are some logs that will contain the tag `` to **hide** some **user** or **computer** **identifiable** information. However, it's possible to **install a certificate to disclose this information**. Follow the explanations from [**here**](https://superuser.com/questions/1532031/how-to-show-private-data-in-macos-unified-log). ### Hopper #### Left panel In the left panel of hopper it's possible to see the symbols (**Labels**) of the binary, the list of procedures and functions (**Proc**) and the strings (**Str**). Those aren't all the strings but the ones defined in several parts of the Mac-O file (like *cstring or* `objc_methname`). #### Middle panel In the middle panel you can see the **dissasembled code**. And you can see it a **raw** disassemble, as **graph**, as **decompiled** and as **binary** by clicking on the respective icon:
Right clicking in a code object you can see **references to/from that object** or even change its name (this doesn't work in decompiled pseudocode):
Moreover, in the **middle down you can write python commands**. #### Right panel In the right panel you can see interesting information such as the **navigation history** (so you know how you arrived at the current situation), the **call grap**h where you can see all the **functions that call this function** and all the functions that **this function calls**, and **local variables** information. ### dtrace It allows users access to applications at an extremely **low level** and provides a way for users to **trace** **programs** and even change their execution flow. Dtrace uses **probes** which are **placed throughout the kernel** and are at locations such as the beginning and end of system calls. DTrace uses the **`dtrace_probe_create`** function to create a probe for each system call. These probes can be fired in the **entry and exit point of each system call**. The interaction with DTrace occur through /dev/dtrace which is only available for the root user. {% hint style="success" %} To enable Dtrace without fully disabling SIP protection you could execute on recovery mode: `csrutil enable --without dtrace` You can also **`dtrace`** or **`dtruss`** binaries that **you have compiled**. {% endhint %} The available probes of dtrace can be obtained with: ```bash dtrace -l | head ID PROVIDER MODULE FUNCTION NAME 1 dtrace BEGIN 2 dtrace END 3 dtrace ERROR 43 profile profile-97 44 profile profile-199 ``` The probe name consists of four parts: the provider, module, function, and name (`fbt:mach_kernel:ptrace:entry`). If you not specifies some part of the name, Dtrace will apply that part as a wildcard. To configure DTrace to activate probes and to specify what actions to perform when they fire, we will need to use the D language. A more detailed explanation and more examples can be found in #### Examples Run `man -k dtrace` to list the **DTrace scripts available**. Example: `sudo dtruss -n binary` * In line ```bash #Count the number of syscalls of each running process sudo dtrace -n 'syscall:::entry {@[execname] = count()}' ``` * script ```bash syscall:::entry /pid == $1/ { } #Log every syscall of a PID sudo dtrace -s script.d 1234 ``` ```bash syscall::open:entry { printf("%s(%s)", probefunc, copyinstr(arg0)); } syscall::close:entry { printf("%s(%d)\n", probefunc, arg0); } #Log files opened and closed by a process sudo dtrace -s b.d -c "cat /etc/hosts" ``` ```bash syscall:::entry { ; } syscall:::return { printf("=%d\n", arg1); } #Log sys calls with values sudo dtrace -s syscalls_info.d -c "cat /etc/hosts" ``` ### dtruss ```bash dtruss -c ls #Get syscalls of ls dtruss -c -p 1000 #get syscalls of PID 1000 ``` ### kdebug It's a kernel tracing facility. The documented codes can be found in **`/usr/share/misc/trace.codes`**. Tools like `latency`, `sc_usage`, `fs_usage` and `trace` use it internally. To interface with `kdebug` `sysctl` is used over the `kern.kdebug` namespace and the MIBs to use can be found in `sys/sysctl.h` having the functions implemented in `bsd/kern/kdebug.c`. To interact with kdebug with a custom client these are usually the steps: * Remove existing settings with KERN\_KDSETREMOVE * Set trace with KERN\_KDSETBUF and KERN\_KDSETUP * Use KERN\_KDGETBUF to get number of buffer entries * Get the own client out of the trace with KERN\_KDPINDEX * Enable tracing with KERN\_KDENABLE * Read the buffer calling KERN\_KDREADTR * To match each thread with its process call KERN\_KDTHRMAP. In order to get this information it's possible to use the Apple tool **`trace`** or the custom tool [kDebugView (kdv)](https://newosxbook.com/tools/kdv.html)**.** **Note that Kdebug is only available for 1 costumer at a time.** So only one k-debug powered tool can be executed at the same time. ### ktrace The `ktrace_*` APIs come from `libktrace.dylib` which wrap those of `Kdebug`. Then, a client can just call `ktrace_session_create` and `ktrace_events_[single/class]` to set callbacks on specific codes and then start it with `ktrace_start`. You can use this one even with **SIP activated** You can use as clients the utility `ktrace`: ```bash ktrace trace -s -S -t c -c ls | grep "ls(" ``` Or `tailspin`. ### kperf This is used to do a kernel level profiling and it's built using `Kdebug` callouts. Basically, the global variable `kernel_debug_active` is checked and is set it calls `kperf_kdebug_handler` withe `Kdebug` code and address of the kernel frame calling. If the `Kdebug` code matches one selected it gets the "actions" configured as a bitmap (check `osfmk/kperf/action.h` for the options). Kperf has a sysctl MIB table also: (as root) `sysctl kperf`. These code can be found in `osfmk/kperf/kperfbsd.c`. Moreover, a subset of Kperfs functionality resides in `kpc`, which provides information about machine performance counters. ### ProcessMonitor [**ProcessMonitor**](https://objective-see.com/products/utilities.html#ProcessMonitor) is a very useful tool to check the process related actions a process is performing (for example, monitor which new processes a process is creating). ### SpriteTree [**SpriteTree**](https://themittenmac.com/tools/) is a tool to prints the relations between processes.\ You need to monitor your mac with a command like **`sudo eslogger fork exec rename create > cap.json`** (the terminal launching this required FDA). And then you can load the json in this tool to view all the relations:
### FileMonitor [**FileMonitor**](https://objective-see.com/products/utilities.html#FileMonitor) allows to monitor file events (such as creation, modifications, and deletions) providing detailed information about such events. ### Crescendo [**Crescendo**](https://github.com/SuprHackerSteve/Crescendo) is a GUI tool with the look and feel Windows users may know from Microsoft Sysinternal’s *Procmon*. This tool allows the recording of various event types to be started and stopped, allows for the filtering of these events by categories such as file, process, network, etc., and provides the functionality to save the events recorded in a json format. ### Apple Instruments [**Apple Instruments**](https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/Performance/Conceptual/CellularBestPractices/Appendix/Appendix.html) are part of Xcode’s Developer tools – used for monitoring application performance, identifying memory leaks and tracking filesystem activity. ![](/files/d0KUeOaQR1WwSiQq5NmF) ### fs\_usage Allows to follow actions performed by processes: ```bash fs_usage -w -f filesys ls #This tracks filesystem actions of proccess names containing ls fs_usage -w -f network curl #This tracks network actions ``` ### TaskExplorer [**Taskexplorer**](https://objective-see.com/products/taskexplorer.html) is useful to see the **libraries** used by a binary, the **files** it's using and the **network** connections.\ It also checks the binary processes against **virustotal** and show information about the binary. ## PT\_DENY\_ATTACH In [**this blog post**](https://knight.sc/debugging/2019/06/03/debugging-apple-binaries-that-use-pt-deny-attach.html) you can find an example about how to **debug a running daemon** that used **`PT_DENY_ATTACH`** to prevent debugging even if SIP was disabled. ### lldb **lldb** is the de **facto tool** for **macOS** binary **debugging**. ```bash lldb ./malware.bin lldb -p 1122 lldb -n malware.bin lldb -n malware.bin --waitfor ``` You can set intel flavour when using lldb creating a file called **`.lldbinit`** in your home folder with the following line: ```bash settings set target.x86-disassembly-flavor intel ``` {% hint style="warning" %} Inside lldb, dump a process with `process save-core` {% endhint %}
(lldb) CommandDescription
run (r)Starting execution, which will continue unabated until a breakpoint is hit or the process terminates.
continue (c)Continue execution of the debugged process.
nexti (n / ni)Execute the next instruction. This command will skip over function calls.
stepi (s / si)Execute the next instruction. Unlike the nexti command, this command will step into function calls.
finish (f)Execute the rest of the instructions in the current function (“frame”) return and halt.
control + cPause execution. If the process has been run (r) or continued (c), this will cause the process to halt ...wherever it is currently executing.
breakpoint (b)

b main #Any func called main

b <binname>`main #Main func of the bin

b set -n main --shlib <lib_name> #Main func of the indicated bin

b -[NSDictionary objectForKey:]

b -a 0x0000000100004bd9

br l #Breakpoint list

br e/dis <num> #Enable/Disable breakpoint

breakpoint delete <num>

help

help breakpoint #Get help of breakpoint command

help memory write #Get help to write into the memory

reg

reg read

reg read $rax

reg read $rax --format <format>

reg write $rip 0x100035cc0

x/s <reg/memory address>Display the memory as a null-terminated string.
x/i <reg/memory address>Display the memory as assembly instruction.
x/b <reg/memory address>Display the memory as byte.
print object (po)

This will print the object referenced by the param

po $raw

{

dnsChanger = {

"affiliate" = "";

"blacklist_dns" = ();

Note that most of Apple’s Objective-C APIs or methods return objects, and thus should be displayed via the “print object” (po) command. If po doesn't produce a meaningful output use x/b

memorymemory read 0x000....
memory read $x0+0xf2a
memory write 0x100600000 -s 4 0x41414141 #Write AAAA in that address
memory write -f s $rip+0x11f+7 "AAAA" #Write AAAA in the addr
disassembly

dis #Disas current function

dis -n <funcname> #Disas func

dis -n <funcname> -b <basename> #Disas func
dis -c 6 #Disas 6 lines
dis -c 0x100003764 -e 0x100003768 # From one add until the other
dis -p -c 4 # Start in current address disassembling

parrayparray 3 (char **)$x1 # Check array of 3 components in x1 reg
{% hint style="info" %} When calling the **`objc_sendMsg`** function, the **rsi** register holds the **name of the method** as a null-terminated (“C”) string. To print the name via lldb do: `(lldb) x/s $rsi: 0x1000f1576: "startMiningWithPort:password:coreCount:slowMemory:currency:"` `(lldb) print (char*)$rsi:`\ `(char *) $1 = 0x00000001000f1576 "startMiningWithPort:password:coreCount:slowMemory:currency:"` `(lldb) reg read $rsi: rsi = 0x00000001000f1576 "startMiningWithPort:password:coreCount:slowMemory:currency:"` {% endhint %} ### Anti-Dynamic Analysis #### VM detection * The command **`sysctl hw.model`** returns "Mac" when the **host is a MacOS** but something different when it's a VM. * Playing with the values of **`hw.logicalcpu`** and **`hw.physicalcpu`** some malwares try to detect if it's a VM. * Some malwares can also **detect** if the machine is **VMware** based on the MAC address (00:50:56). * It's also possible to find **if a process is being debugged** with a simple code such us: * `if(P_TRACED == (info.kp_proc.p_flag & P_TRACED)){ //process being debugged }` * It can also invoke the **`ptrace`** system call with the **`PT_DENY_ATTACH`** flag. This **prevents** a deb**u**gger from attaching and tracing. * You can check if the **`sysctl`** or **`ptrace`** function is being **imported** (but the malware could import it dynamically) * As noted in this writeup, “[Defeating Anti-Debug Techniques: macOS ptrace variants](https://alexomara.com/blog/defeating-anti-debug-techniques-macos-ptrace-variants/)” :\ “*The message Process # exited with **status = 45 (0x0000002d)** is usually a tell-tale sign that the debug target is using **PT\_DENY\_ATTACH***” ## Core Dumps Core dumps are created if: * `kern.coredump` sysctl is set to 1 (by default) * If the process wasn't suid/sgid or `kern.sugid_coredump` is 1 (by default is 0) * The `AS_CORE` limit allows the operation. It's possible to suppress code dumps creation by calling `ulimit -c 0` and re-enable them with `ulimit -c unlimited`. In those cases the core dumps is generated according to `kern.corefile` sysctl and stored usually in `/cores/core/.%P`. ## Fuzzing ### [ReportCrash](https://ss64.com/osx/reportcrash.html) ReportCrash **analyzes crashing processes and saves a crash report to disk**. A crash report contains information that can **help a developer diagnose** the cause of a crash.\ For applications and other processes **running in the per-user launchd context**, ReportCrash runs as a LaunchAgent and saves crash reports in the user's `~/Library/Logs/DiagnosticReports/`\ For daemons, other processes **running in the system launchd context** and other privileged processes, ReportCrash runs as a LaunchDaemon and saves crash reports in the system's `/Library/Logs/DiagnosticReports` If you are worried about crash reports **being sent to Apple** you can disable them. If not, crash reports can be useful to **figure out how a server crashed**. ```bash #To disable crash reporting: launchctl unload -w /System/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.ReportCrash.plist sudo launchctl unload -w /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.ReportCrash.Root.plist #To re-enable crash reporting: launchctl load -w /System/Library/LaunchAgents/com.apple.ReportCrash.plist sudo launchctl load -w /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.ReportCrash.Root.plist ``` ### Sleep While fuzzing in a MacOS it's important to not allow the Mac to sleep: * systemsetup -setsleep Never * pmset, System Preferences * [KeepingYouAwake](https://github.com/newmarcel/KeepingYouAwake) #### SSH Disconnect If you are fuzzing via a SSH connection it's important to make sure the session isn't going to day. So change the sshd\_config file with: * TCPKeepAlive Yes * ClientAliveInterval 0 * ClientAliveCountMax 0 ```bash sudo launchctl unload /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ssh.plist sudo launchctl load -w /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ssh.plist ``` ### Internal Handlers **Checkout the following page** to find out how you can find which app is responsible of **handling the specified scheme or protocol:** {% content-ref url="/pages/LgnBZ572ISyEu4v7TDlb" %} [macOS File Extension & URL scheme app handlers](/hacktricks/macos-hardening/macos-security-and-privilege-escalation/macos-file-extension-apps.md) {% endcontent-ref %} ### Enumerating Network Processes This interesting to find processes that are managing network data: ```bash dtrace -n 'syscall::recv*:entry { printf("-> %s (pid=%d)", execname, pid); }' >> recv.log #wait some time sort -u recv.log > procs.txt cat procs.txt ``` Or use `netstat` or `lsof` ### Libgmalloc
{% code overflow="wrap" %} ```bash lldb -o "target create `which some-binary`" -o "settings set target.env-vars DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES=/usr/lib/libgmalloc.dylib" -o "run arg1 arg2" -o "bt" -o "reg read" -o "dis -s \$pc-32 -c 24 -m -F intel" -o "quit" ``` {% endcode %} ### Fuzzers #### [AFL++](https://github.com/AFLplusplus/AFLplusplus) Works for CLI tools #### [Litefuzz](https://github.com/sec-tools/litefuzz) It "**just works"** with macOS GUI tools. Note some some macOS apps have some specific requirements like unique filenames, the right extension, need to read the files from the sandbox (`~/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data`)... Some examples: {% code overflow="wrap" %} ```bash # iBooks litefuzz -l -c "/System/Applications/Books.app/Contents/MacOS/Books FUZZ" -i files/epub -o crashes/ibooks -t /Users/test/Library/Containers/com.apple.iBooksX/Data/tmp -x 10 -n 100000 -ez # -l : Local # -c : cmdline with FUZZ word (if not stdin is used) # -i : input directory or file # -o : Dir to output crashes # -t : Dir to output runtime fuzzing artifacts # -x : Tmeout for the run (default is 1) # -n : Num of fuzzing iterations (default is 1) # -e : enable second round fuzzing where any crashes found are reused as inputs # -z : enable malloc debug helpers # Font Book litefuzz -l -c "/System/Applications/Font Book.app/Contents/MacOS/Font Book FUZZ" -i input/fonts -o crashes/font-book -x 2 -n 500000 -ez # smbutil (using pcap capture) litefuzz -lk -c "smbutil view smb://localhost:4455" -a tcp://localhost:4455 -i input/mac-smb-resp -p -n 100000 -z # screensharingd (using pcap capture) litefuzz -s -a tcp://localhost:5900 -i input/screenshared-session --reportcrash screensharingd -p -n 100000 ``` {% endcode %} ### More Fuzzing MacOS Info * * * * ## References * [**OS X Incident Response: Scripting and Analysis**](https://www.amazon.com/OS-Incident-Response-Scripting-Analysis-ebook/dp/B01FHOHHVS) * [**https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T5xfL9tEg44**](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T5xfL9tEg44) * [**https://taomm.org/vol1/analysis.html**](https://taomm.org/vol1/analysis.html) * [**The Art of Mac Malware: The Guide to Analyzing Malicious Software**](https://taomm.org/) ### [WhiteIntel](https://whiteintel.io)
[**WhiteIntel**](https://whiteintel.io) is a **dark-web** fueled search engine that offers **free** functionalities to check if a company or its customers have been **compromised** by **stealer malwares**. Their primary goal of WhiteIntel is to combat account takeovers and ransomware attacks resulting from information-stealing malware. You can check their website and try their engine for **free** at: {% embed url="" %} {% hint style="success" %} Learn & practice AWS Hacking:[**HackTricks Training AWS Red Team Expert (ARTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/arte)\ Learn & practice GCP Hacking: [**HackTricks Training GCP Red Team Expert (GRTE)**](https://training.hacktricks.xyz/courses/grte)
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